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A B S T R A C T
The idea has gained ground in recent years that, as conﬂicts in the countries of
the Great Lakes Region are strongly interlinked, regional approaches are
necessary to resolve them. This interest in regional dimensions of conﬂict
and peacebuilding also gains currency in other parts of the world. Attention to
regional approaches is reﬂected in the eﬀorts of international organisations
and donors to promote civil society peacebuilding. They assume that regional
cooperation and exchange between civil society organisations contribute to
peace, and provide an alternative to single-country interventions or regional
diplomatic initiatives. This paper explores how such assumptions work out
in practice. Experiences in the Great Lakes Region show that local and inter-
national organisations have diﬃculty in analysing the regional character of
conﬂict and arriving at collaborative regional strategies. Moreover, local civil
society organisations are deeply embedded in the politics of regional conﬂict.
Consequently, the shift to regional peacebuilding approaches remains more
theoretical than practical. This paper suggests that international supporting
organisations need to adjust their ambitions in regional peacebuilding, but
nonetheless have roles in fostering regional identiﬁcation among civil society
organisations.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Countries in the region are communicating vessels.1
A regional approach is not so much the fashion of the day, it is a necessity.2
Despite a regional peace deal in 2002, and the formal ending of transition
periods in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR
Congo), peace in the Great Lakes Region remains uncertain. While each
of the countries has its own history of conﬂict, developments are also
similar or strongly related. All three experienced Belgian colonisation,
resulting in states organised on the basis of ethnic and regional diﬀerences.
Politics and violence in Rwanda since independence have strongly im-
pacted on developments in Burundi and vice-versa. Flows of refugees,
military intervention by neighbouring countries and cross-border war
economies have further contributed to the regional character of conﬂict.
Over recent years, a discourse has developed that the strongly inter-
linked problems in the individual countries require approaches that tran-
scend the level of individual countries. Regional approaches for
peacebuilding are required. Thus, the last few years have witnessed an
increase in the regional activities of international organisations, govern-
ments and non-government organisations (NGOs). This promotion of
regional approaches to peacebuilding resonates in international support
to the peacebuilding eﬀorts of local civil society. Many international
organisations and donors assume that regional cooperation and exchange
between local civil society organisations contribute to peace at regional
level, and provide an alternative to single-country interventions or re-
gional diplomatic initiatives.
Regional approaches to conﬂict and civil society peacebuilding are also
gaining ground in other parts of the world. Nonetheless, this is a relatively
new idea. Most civil society peacebuilding eﬀorts remain focused on single
countries, even in the Great Lakes Region. The current attention to re-
gional peacebuilding thus raises several questions. Why would a regional
approach to peacebuilding be more eﬀective than an approach focusing
on individual countries? How can regional interpretations of conﬂict be
successfully translated into regional peacebuilding strategies? What are
the experiences so far with civil society regional peacebuilding? Hence, is
the shift to regional approaches for peacebuilding in fact desirable?
This paper attempts to provide insights into these questions by explor-
ing how regional peacebuilding works out in practice. It explores the case
of international NGOs and local civil society organisations in the Great
Lakes Region. Its starting point is that regional discourses are ordering
mechanisms to understand complex conﬂict dynamics (cf. Law 1994). In
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the encounters between civil society organisations, however, it remains
diﬃcult to translate awareness of the regional character of conﬂict
into practicable regional responses. This reﬂects theoretical diﬃculties of
regional analysis and programming. At the same time, arriving at a shared
understanding of regional issues and possible strategies among civil
society organisations is not only a theoretical, but also a political, en-
deavour. In the Great Lakes Region, local civil society organisations are
deeply embedded in the politics of regional conﬂict. Consequently, the
shift to regional peacebuilding approaches remains theoretical with
limited actions on the ground. Finally, the paper comments on the am-
bitions of international organisations supporting regional civil society
peacebuilding.
The paper is based on research conducted from September 2004 to
September 2005, in the context of a research programme on peace-
building policy and practice.3 This included interviews with representa-
tives of forty-nine local and twenty-nine international organisations and
donors. For practical reasons, the research was limited to organisations
working in Burundi,Rwanda and theKivu provinces in easternDRCongo.
During the research period, I was based in Burundi, where I conducted
research on land disputes and local dispute resolving mechanisms with the
Catholic organisation CED-Caritas (see van Leeuwen & Haartsen 2005),
with whom I organised a regional symposium on land disputes.
This paper is organised as follows. First, I reﬂect on current thinking on
regional approaches and their eﬀectiveness for peacebuilding. This is
followed by a review of the regional dynamics of conﬂict in the Great
Lakes Region, and an overview of the strategies currently employed
by international and local civil society organisations. Thereafter, I reﬂect
on how those strategies work out in practice, and what this implies
for international organisations supporting civil society regional peace-
building.
G L O B A L D I S C O U R S E S O F R E G I O N S A N D R E G I O N A L P E A C E B U I L D I N G
The fact that internal conﬂicts generally produce instability at the regional level
means that eﬀective strategies to proactively engage conﬂict situations will require
a co-ordinated regional approach. (OECD-AC 1997, par. 293)
Contemporary conﬂict analysis highlights the intra-state nature of
conﬂicts and their civilian character, but also acknowledges that many
conﬂicts are not simply ‘ internal ’ wars : their causes and consequences
often transgress national borders. Terms such as ‘ trans-national war’
(Kaldor 2001), or ‘regional conﬂict formation’ (Rubin 2001) point to this
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regional character of contemporary conﬂict. Several authors suggest that,
since the end of the Cold War, conﬂicts have ‘regionalised’, as an out-
come of Cold War strategies or a by-product of globalisation (Collier
2000; FitzGerald 1999; World Bank 2000). But the interest in the regional
dynamics of conﬂict may also be seen as a policy response to failures in
dealing with conﬂicts in individual countries, or as a lack of engagement
with those conﬂicts. Here, the current attention to regional approaches is
treated as a discourse: a particular representation for understanding and
acting upon the world around us. There are always multiple discourses,
and these are constantly renegotiated (Hilhorst 2003). The regional dis-
course comes as an alternative to the preoccupation with ‘nations’ as the
central protagonists in conﬂicts, and coincides with an increasing attention
to ‘ the region’ within development debates.
The emphasis on the regional character of conﬂict resonates in the
international support for civil society peacebuilding. Since the early 1990s,
civil society has been attributed important roles in peacebuilding, in par-
ticular in contributing to good governance and democracy. Civil society
organisations are seen as representing the forces in favour of peace, or the
‘ shared vision’ of a local population as opposed to the machinations of
states. Often, civil society is deﬁned as politically neutral, or even apolitical
(see Crowther 2001 ; Goodhand 2006; Pearce 2005; Rupesinghe 1998; van
Rooy 1998). In the light of the regional peacebuilding discourse, civil
society organisations are considered to facilitate the coming together of
communities in favour of peace, which are separated by state borders.
Further, civil society organisations are seen as alternative or complemen-
tary to regional diplomatic initiatives, and are considered more supportive
to peace than the heads of states in the region (see also Lund 1999: 57 ;
Mbabazi & Shaw 2000). This paper considers the initiatives of inter-
national organisations to facilitate regional exchange and collaboration
of their partners from civil society, as well as the regional projects and
imaginations by civil society itself.
Assumptions about regional peacebuilding
Various ideas circulate as to why ‘ the region’ would be an appropriate
and more eﬀective entry for peacebuilding. First, an important notion is
that regional cooperation contributes to peace as it creates mutual beneﬁts
and dependences (Alagappa 1995). In particular in Africa, there is much
attention to regional bodies, such as the regional diplomatic initiatives
of the African Union, and the peacekeeping mechanisms of regional
economic communities such as IGAD and ECOWAS (see e.g. Juma &
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Mengistu 2002). Such bodies are promoted on the assumption that con-
ﬂicts may be earlier detected, and more easily resolved, through them.4 In
addition, regional bodies may reduce the necessity for the international
community to intervene in conﬂicts, while diplomatic intervention by
governments from the region is supposedly more eﬀective (e.g. OECD-
DAC 1997: par. 297). In the Great Lakes Region, a localised version of this
idea proposes building on cross-border cultural and linguistic aﬃnities, or
continuities in the form of family relations, trade and intellectual ex-
change.
A related idea is that mutual dependence can bring parties together
who otherwise are not on speaking terms. For example, a hydro-electrical
power plant in the Ruzizi River at the DR Congo/Rwanda-border was
never aﬀected by conﬂict, and some see such economic dependences in
the region as starting points for regional peace. Within debates on natural
resources and conﬂict, a developing idea is that cooperation on shared
ecological challenges might be a prelude to peacebuilding. Even if wider
dialogue has come to an end, discussion on shared natural resources may
be established or continue. In addition, the resolution of cross-border
ecological problems may be a precondition for broader peace (Conca et al.
2005; Turton et al. 2006), while development corridors and trans-frontier
natural parks oﬀer alternatives to regional conﬂict (Shaw 2003).
Thirdly, many people interviewed in the course of this research share
the core assumption that, if conﬂicts in a region are connected, focusing on
their manifestations in individual countries separately is ineﬀective.
Examples of such ineﬀective strategies are strengthening good governance
in one country in a ‘bad neighbourhood’ of failing states, and addressing
ﬂuid cross-border networks for trading small arms only in particular states
(see Kaldor 2001; Tschirgi 2002). This implies that strategies for peace-
building should address conﬂict dynamics in diﬀerent countries at the
same time.
The positive version of this argument is that developments in one
country may also positively inﬂuence developments in another. For ex-
ample, regional approaches may help to surpass patriotic discourses, and
to acknowledge how developments in one’s own country impinge on the
history of other countries. An exponent of this idea is Mamdani (2001),
who identiﬁes Rwanda as the epicentre of the wider crisis in the Great
Lakes Region. He sees Rwanda as the source of a citizenship problem, in
which full citizenship is denied to residents who are branded as ethnic
strangers. In his view, a regional reform of citizenship is necessary to re-
form Rwanda. Political reform in Burundi could be signiﬁcant, as past
developments in Burundi have been read by Rwanda as prophetic signs
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of their common fate and vice versa (Mamdani 2001: 280). In a similar
vein, in 2005, expatriates in the Great Lakes Region expected a positive
inﬂuence from successful elections in Burundi on the electoral process
in DR Congo. Several development organisations pointed to the peace-
building potential of the media at regional level. Exchanges and
common programmes for journalists would enhance freedom of ex-
pression in individual countries, and stimulate mutual understanding in
the region.
Lastly, an assumption underlying various regional perspectives is that
the region oﬀers the opportunity to surpass the country level, and go
beyond individual governments and their particular sensitivities. In this
perspective, the region is a forum where the international community can
intervene and launch opinions, criticism and ideas, without addressing
and confronting particular governments. The idea of the region as a safe
haven for the generation of ideas also underlies initiatives for regional
programmes with civil society organisations. This is based on the as-
sumption that these are in a position to inﬂuence their governments to
accept compromises without losing face, or to introduce new ideas. On a
more practical level, regional perspectives are assumed to provide the
opportunity for civil society organisations to take advantage of experiences
from elsewhere in the region. To realise this potential, exchanges and
meetings between diﬀerent actors from the region are stimulated. The
exchange of experiences is the major objective of most civil society re-
gional initiatives so far taking place in the Great Lakes Region.
Deﬁning regions
Realising that conﬂicts have regional dimensions is one thing, analysing
them and deﬁning regional strategies is another. Tschirgi (2002) points out
that the external dimensions of internal conﬂicts are often seen in terms of
‘ spill-over eﬀects ’, while in fact many conﬂicts need to be seen as ‘ trans-
national ’ in nature rather than as an aggregation of internal conﬂicts.
Moreover, it is diﬃcult to deal with the notion of ‘ region’. While regions
may be deﬁned in terms of social groups or political identities (countries,
provinces), in many cases regional conﬂicts include actors and networks
that are far beyond such limitations. These may involve networks of
armed groups, but also (illicit) economic or social networks, or region-wide
grievances that mobilise people (Tschirgi 2002: 8). Regions should then
be seen more as arenas for networked interactions than as geographic
entities. Networks may expand or diminish, and their focus may shift. In
the Great Lakes Region, the centre of regional conﬂict was perhaps
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located in Rwanda in the early 1990s, but later moved to DR Congo
(Rubin 2001: 3).
An important question is then how to deﬁne regions. In daily parlance,
the use of the term is confused, including for example ecological regions
(the Sahel), economic regions (the European Union), and political or his-
torical regions (the Eastern Bloc). A conceptual note on regions is thus
necessary. In the remainder of this chapter, regions are referred to as
social constructions resulting from identiﬁcation. Such an understanding
draws on constructivist perspectives within geography that try to under-
stand regions as a result of the meaning people give to their surroundings,
and the regional identity they inscribe on them (Simon 2004). The con-
structed identity of a region may be accepted by others and be re-
produced, or be rejected or redeﬁned. To substantiate their interpretation
of regions, people may refer to attributes such as cultural–historical
inheritance, ethnicity, religion, language (Pater et al. 2002: 127ﬀ ). This
notion comes close to the work of Anderson (1983/1991), who talks
of nations as ‘ imagined communities ’ – i.e. a nation comes into being
because individuals feel related to each other and hence form a com-
munity. Similarly, regions may be seen as imagined communities that are
a collective social achievement. Regions are thus constructs of their in-
habitants, but also of others, such as national states, international devel-
opment organisations, and analysts. Those outsiders may recognise and
build on local imaginations of regions, or rather give their own meaning to
what constitutes ‘ the region’. The case study of the Great Lakes Region
demonstrates how local and international actors have their own inter-
pretations of what constitutes the region. Their interpretations depend on
what characteristics are considered, what issues are looked at, how these
are analysed, and by whom. Such interpretations are often heavily politi-
cised. This paper explores how national civil society organisations and
international organisations imagine and construct the region and try to
apply this in practice.
A B R I E F H I S T O R Y O F R E G I O N A L C O N F L I C T I N T H E G R E A T
L A K E S R E G I O N
Conﬂict in the Great Lakes Region has a long history that goes back at
least to colonial times. Colonial policies in Rwanda and Burundi resulted
in an institutionalised antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi populations
(Malkki 1995; Prunier 1995/1997; Reijntjens 1994). During and after the
decolonisation process, this resulted in several rounds of ethnic violence
and refugee ﬂows to neighbouring countries. In the early 1990s, when
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negotiations for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees did not succeed,
this led to guerrilla intrusions into Rwanda by the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF) made up mainly of Tutsi refugees residing in Uganda. When
in April 1994 the president of Rwanda was killed in the shooting down
of his plane, this meant the abrupt beginning of a genocide, in which
probably more than 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed.
The genocide resulted in a mass exodus of Hutu refugees to then eastern
Zaire.
From the refugee camps, extremist militia and members of the former
army of Rwanda launched attacks on Rwanda and Burundi. The presence
of Rwandese refugees in the eastern Kivu provinces of Zaire fed strongly
into local tensions. It was here that in 1996 the Kabila-led rebellion started
that – with support fromRwanda andUganda – resulted in the dethroning
of president Mobutu in 1997. However, internal support for Kabila van-
ished rapidly, and his failure to remove Rwandan and Ugandan rebels
from Congolese soil soured relations with his allies. A new rebellion by the
Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie (RCD) started in the Kivus
in 1998, again supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, evolving
into the second Congolese war. Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad
and Sudan intervened on Kinshasa’s side. At the end of 1999, half of
Congolese territory was in the hands of various rebels, and a stalemate
developed. Relations between Rwanda and Uganda soon turned sour,
and their troops started ﬁghting in north-east DR Congo, resulting in the
splintering of the RCD into several factions.
International diplomatic interventions in this regional crisis led to the
signing of the Lusaka ceaseﬁre agreement, the deployment of a UN force
in eastern Congo, and an ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ to facilitate a tran-
sition to a democracy. Over the course of 2002, a national agreement on
power-sharing was reached. Rwanda agreed to a complete withdrawal of
troops, and in exchange Kinshasa would disarm the extremist Rwandan
rebels on its soil. In 2003 a transitional period started which concluded
with the elections in 2006. Nonetheless, violence in eastern DR Congo
continued into 2005, resulting from the presence of various militia and
troops from Rwanda and Uganda, as well as the indigenous Mai-Mai
movements and other local defence forces. In the eastern Kivu provinces,
the relationship between the local RCD faction and the populations under
its control remained problematic. Kivutians perceived the RCD as de-
pendent on Rwanda’s Tutsi leadership, trying to proﬁt as much from
the ‘occupied territories ’ as possible. In June 2004, the temporary take-
over of Bukavu by an RCD commander led to the ﬂight of thousands of
Banyamulenge (who had become closely identiﬁed with the Rwandese),
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fearing reprisals by the Congolese army. As a result of the incident,
ﬁghting broke out north of Bukavu and around Goma, and Rwandese
troops allegedly crossed the border to intervene and clashed with the DR
Congo army. While Rwanda remained relatively stable, at the time of
ﬁeldwork, some rebels in Burundi had not laid down their arms, despite
various dialogues.
Though each of the countries in the region has its own history of con-
ﬂict, developments are also similar or strongly related. This regional
character of conﬂict results from several elements. The ﬁrst is the failure in
all countries to establish inclusive political systems, guaranteeing equal
access to decision-making and resources. In DR Congo, Mobutu estab-
lished a system of governance characterised by corruption, personal en-
richment, patronage and ethnic favouritism (ICG 2003b: 25ﬀ. ; Rogier
2003: 3). Democratisation in the early 1990s facilitated the further devel-
opment of the ethnic divisionism introduced under Mobutu, with ethnic
identity, citizenship and land rights getting closely connected (Mamdani
2001: 25ﬀ. ; see also Young 2006). In both Rwanda and Burundi, states
were established on the basis of ethnic and regional diﬀerences (Prunier
1995/1997; Reijntjens 1994). Rwanda became characterised by a high
level of institutionalisation, with a hierarchical, omnipresent and forceful
state system (Reijntjens 1994). Political exclusion is often seen as the key to
understand the diﬃcult relations between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and
Rwanda, and Banyarwanda and non-Banyarwanda in eastern Congo (e.g.
Lemarchand 2000: 326–7).
Secondly, ethnicity is a regional issue in itself. Ethnicised political viol-
ence in either Rwanda or Burundi has stimulated civil violence in the
neighbouring country. After the Rwanda genocide, cross-border ethnic
aﬃliations have facilitated the reproduction of ethnic faultlines to North
Kivu (ICG 2003b; Vlassenroot & Huggins 2005) and South Kivu ( Jackson
2002). Ethnic solidarity is understood as an important reason for
Rwanda’s engagement in DR Congo (Longman 2002). Since 1996, all
Tutsi in eastern Congo were increasingly referred to as Banyamulenge
(Lemarchand 2000). Various organisations in eastern DR Congo also
underscored the importance of language in the antagonism between
various Congolese groups and Kinyarwanda-speaking people. For ex-
ample, the violence that erupted in Masisi in 1993, in the context of
growing land shortage, was directed against all Kinyarwanda speakers –
both Hutu and Tutsi – who had acquired large properties in the region.
After the June 2004 takeover of Bukavu, civil society in Goma split up into
two ‘ factions’ : Kinyarwanda speakers and non-Kinyarwanda speakers.
Resentments by the indigenous population in North Kivu were reignited
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by local leaders who suggested the involvement of Kinyarwanda speakers
in alleged intentions of Rwanda to annex the area.
Further, the large-scale refugee movements in the Great Lakes Region
played important roles as ‘vectors of contamination’ (Lemarchand 2000:
332) in the reproduction of ethnic polarisation across borders. Moreover,
refugee camps have been used as training and recruitment camps for rebel
militias, and as bases for attacks on the home countries. This was the case
in the ‘Mulelist ’ insurgency in 1964–5 in eastern Zaire, the RPF rebellion
in Rwanda that started from Ugandan refugee camps in 1990, and the
attacks on Rwanda from militia that reorganised in the refugee camps in
eastern DR Congo after the 1994 genocide (Prunier 1995/1997; Reijntjens
1994). According to Lemarchand (2000: 331), the ‘dynamics of violence in
the Great Lakes involves the transformation of refugee-generating viol-
ence into violence-generating refugee ﬂows’.
The regional character of conﬂict is also related to an abundance of
mineral resources. Mineral wealth in DR Congo provides decision-makers
with continuous resources to sustain violence (Collier 2000). In the absence
of an eﬀective state system in DR Congo, a warlord system of exploitation
has come into being, which includes not only the Congolese elite, but also
those of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Zimbabwe (UNSC 2001). This
war economy has reached such a scale that several observers have come to
regard it as an explanation in itself for the failure of the peace accords and
the continuation of the war, with control over mineral resources becoming
a military objective in itself (see Reijntjens 2001 : 312).
Finally, scarcity of resources also contributes to conﬂict, with land
shortages having resulted in violence through political manipulation. This
analysis was initially made for Rwanda, where the economic situation
and pressure on land has been explained as a central cause of the 1994
violence (Pottier 1997; Prunier 1995/1997: 364). Land was highly politi-
cised, and the Rwanda government used the scarcity of land as an argu-
ment against those Tutsi in exile who wanted to repatriate (African Rights
1994). In Burundi, land problems related to the reintegration of return-
ing refugees and IDPs are a sensitive issue, considering that the expected
return of Hutu refugees and their reclamation of land was one of the
issues triggering violence in 1993 (ICG 2003a; Kamungi et al. 2004: 19).
However, land disputes are also common among the on-staying popu-
lation (van Leeuwen & Haartsen 2005). Land plays a dominant role
in local disputes and has been a root cause of violence in Ituri and the
Kivu provinces (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004). Various authors ana-
lyse how, in eastern DR Congo, land access has become linked to citi-
zenship, as being considered indigenous became a necessity for ethnic
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groups to gain access to land (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot & Huggins
2005: 150).
Developments in the Great Lakes Region thus make conﬂicts regional.
There is no agreement among observers on the relative importance
of each of these, nor on how they interrelate to each other. Lemarchand
(2005: 4) has for example pointed to how theories explaining conﬂict from
the abundance of natural resources sometimes contradict those starting
from shortages of land. As we will see, local and international organis-
ations alike diﬀer considerably on how they understand the interrelatedness
of conﬂict in the region.
At this point, two issues are remarkable about the regional analyses as
they appear in the reports and policy documents of international NGOs,
UN agencies and donor governments. First, most analyses explain the
regional character of conﬂict in the Great Lakes by reference to a series
of key events, often starting with the 1994 genocide,5 followed by the
1996 and 1998 rebellions in eastern Congo. Little attention is given to
related economic and political developments and violence before 1994. It
is as if regional conﬂict starts from scratch with the genocide.
Second, while there is a consensus on the similarities between countries
from the region, most analyses gloss over the diﬀerences that also exist.
While the system of governance established under Mobutu resulted in a
very weak state, the Rwandese state is characterised by a relatively high
level of institutionalisation. In DR Congo, in the absence of healthy state
structures, civil society took far-reaching responsibilities for development
and the provision of services, and became strong and well organised.
In Rwanda, on the other hand, civil society has always been state-
controlled and conformist. And while both Burundi and Rwanda have
been divided in the past by ethnic violence, the signiﬁcance of
ethnicity between those ‘ false twins’ (see Reijntjens 1994) has been rather
diﬀerent. For example, while ethnicity has been abolished by government
decree in Rwanda, peace agreements in Burundi included a power-
sharing arrangement guaranteeing balanced political participation of both
groups.
R E G I O N A L R E S P O N S E S T O T H E C R I S I S
The region of the Great Lakes is an unstable region that for long has been
characterised by armed conﬂicts, ethnic struggle, failing states, ﬂows of refugees
and under-development. In such a context, to assure an eﬀective Dutch contri-
bution, an integrated as well as regional approach was needed (Netherlands MFA
2003: 1).
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Ethnic, linguistic and economic ties between the countries have deep roots in the
region’s history. The economic and social situation is similar across the three
countries, and the causes of poverty and conﬂict are strongly interlinked.
Instability easily spills over national boundaries. Consequently, eﬀorts to solve the
region’s problems are bound to fail if they do not take into account such cross-
border dynamics. (EURAC 2004)
Dans la re´gion des Grands Lacs, il est clair que le processus de re´conciliation dans
un pays est fortement lie´ a` ceux des autres. Toute solution viable aura donc un
caracte`re re´gional. (PaxChristi 2003)
At the time of ﬁeldwork, many international and local organisations were
convinced of the need for regional approaches to peacebuilding,6 and
various organisations developed regional policies. In the ﬁrst place, several
diplomatic initiatives were taken. Prominent among these was a series of
regional conferences convened by the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the UN. The initiative built on the notion of regional
cooperation to enhance peace. The ﬁrst meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in
November 2004 resulted in a declaration of the Heads of State expressing
commitment to promote peace, stability and unity in the region through
the promotion of economic growth. DR Congo President Kabila held
the door open for regional arrangements for the exploitation of natural
resources in eastern DR Congo. In follow-up meetings, proposals were
elaborated on issues such as the proliferation of small arms, joint border
security management, and refugees. The revival of the Communaute´
Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs was considered, to promote economic
and social integration, and to prevent and resolve conﬂicts.
Civil society within countries in the region themselves is of great importance, in
particular in light of the large problems confronting the region and for the cross-
border nature of problems. Ethnic ties, economic relations and other communal
characteristics imply that civil society might play an important role in regional
processes … The establishment of an open and pluriform society cannot be en-
forced from above, but needs to develop, in which civil society from the countries
concerned has to fulﬁl an essential role. (Netherlands MFA 2003: 14)
Secondly, many initiatives of a less diplomatic character developed.
International organisations specialising in civil society peacebuilding felt a
need for regional approaches. They considered that regional exchange
and cooperation between local civil society organisations could contribute
to regional peace, and complement regional diplomacy. Organisations
such as the UN and the EU, several donor governments and international
development organisations thus searched ways to facilitate exchanges.
Their eﬀorts were complemented by those from Rwandese, Burundese
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and Congolese organisations themselves. International organisations also
reﬂected on how their own development programmes could become more
regionally oriented. Various regional civil society peacebuilding strategies
came into being, examples of which are given in Table 1.
The most common regional peacebuilding strategy was the organis-
ation of regional meetings. Facilitated by international agencies, national
civil society organisations liaised regularly with partners from neigh-
bouring countries, primarily to exchange experiences in their ﬁelds of
expertise or policy analyses. To international organisations, regional
partner meetings were useful for training partners, or for enhancing
their own lobby-work. Often, a direct objective of the partner meetings
organised by international development was to contribute to reconcili-
ation between partners from diﬀerent counties.
Some regional meetings formalised into regional platforms or networks
(such as the human rights network LDGL and the women’s network
COCAFemme). For local organisations, such regional networks gave
credibility to their members and facilitated encountering sponsors
(cf. Verkoren 2006). Regional networks further provided protection to
their members against their governments, or served as a means of collec-
tively voicing dissent. For example, civil society organisations protested
together after a parliamentary inquiry in Rwanda in 2004 singled out
various human rights organisations as ‘divisionist ’ ; they also came up with
a collective declaration after the murder of the Vice-Secretary of LDGL in
Bukavu in 2005.
Another strategy was programmatic cooperation at a regional level.
This included the implementation of similar activities by civil society
organisations in diﬀerent countries, cross-border exchange visits, or
programmes implemented collaboratively by civil society groups from
diﬀerent countries. Regional programmes by international organisations
often focused on joint lobbying at an international level. Some of these
started programmes to mobilise civil society groups to exert inﬂuence on
policymaking, or to participate in diplomatic initiatives. Other inter-
national organisations had national programmes with a strong regional
focus.
A notable regional programme was that initiated by the Centre Canadien
d’E´tude et de Coope´ration Internationale (CECI). For its 4-year project Action
Citoyenne pour la Paix (Acipa), regional oﬃces were established in Rwanda,
Burundi and the Kivu provinces, each focusing on their own prioritised
themes of public participation, non-violent conﬂict resolution, promotion
of human rights, and access to information. The oﬃces each had their
own partners, but met regularly to guarantee a common context-analysis,
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TA B L E 1
Examples of strategies for regional peacebuilding involving civil society
Examples Initiators
Regional meetings
$ Preparatory meetings with civil society representatives for the United
Nations International Conferences on Peace, Democracy, Good
Governance and Development in the Great Lakes (UN special
representative
Trans-national
organisation
Exchange of experiences and training of local partners
$ Annual workshop with partners on conﬂict
transformation (ICCO)
$ Regional exchange visits between the churches on their contribution to
peace and reconciliation (Association Convenance Episcopal d’Afrique
Centrale – ACEAC)
$ Regional exchanges between universities on food security and land
issues (Swiss cooperation)
$ Consultations with partners to come to a shared
understanding of conﬂict and obstacles to peace (Pax Christi
International)
$ Exchange meeting on experiences with working on HIV/Aids
(Trocaire)
International
NGOs
$ Regional encounters as a preparation for the UN Great Lakes regional
conferences (COCAFemme)
$ Regional meeting on traditional mechanisms for conﬂict resolution
(Chair UNESCO, Bujumbura University)
$ Regional discussions on Banyamulenge refugees
(convened by LDGL)
National civil society
organisations
Regional platforms and networks
$ ‘ Initiative for Central Africa’, a platform on peace and development,
including civil society, private sector,
universities, civil authorities, NGOs and donors. Its aim is to develop
common visions, and stimulate regional
cooperation and information exchange (OECD)
Trans-national
organisation
Research and conﬂict analysis
$ Seminars for church leaders on regional conﬂict analysis (RIO Bukavu)
$ Annual regional meetings on themes
such as ‘regional economic integration’ and ‘ land and identity’ (Pole
Institute Goma)
National civil society
organisations
Lobby and advocacy
$ The Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Re´gion des Grands Lacs
(LDGL), membership organisation with 27 members from Rwanda,
Burundi and DR Congo in the ﬁeld of human rights or development
$ Concertation des Collectifs des Associations Oeuvrant
pour la Promotion de la Femme (COCAFemme), platform of
collectives of women organisations from Burundi, Rwanda and DR
Congo
National civil society
organisations
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T A B L E 1 (cont.)
Examples Initiators
Regional programmes
$ Multi-Country Demobilisation and
Reintegration Programme (sponsored by the World Bank)
Transnational
organisations
$ The ‘Femmes pour la Paix’ programme intends, through a series of
regional trainings, to establish a framework
that enables women to have inﬂuence on policy making
(International Alert)
$ The ‘Global Partnership for Conﬂict Prevention in Central Africa’
aims to integrate civil society in diplomatic initiatives for conﬂict
prevention at a regional level
(convened by the Netherlands-based European Centre for Conﬂict
Prevention)
$ Cross-border programme on the return of refugees from
Tanzania to Burundi ( JRS)
$ Media programmes, in which journalists from the region are trained
together and collectively make radio-items about regional issues
(Search for Common Ground – SfcG)
$ Youth programme, including exchange visits to guarantee the peaceful
return of Banyamulenge refugees (SfcG)
$ International lobby activities against sexual violence
(International Alert)
International NGOs
$ ‘Commission Mixte’ of the Catholic Church, a regional programme of
the peace commissions of several Burundian and Tanzanian Dioceses,
to facilitate the return of refugees to Burundi (initiated by the Bishops)
$ Research on human rights violations in eastern DRCongo and training
of local organisations in monitoring human rights (Ligue Iteka Burundi)
National civil society
organisations
Intra- organisational regional strategies
$ Appointing a special representative to the region (EU)
$ Developing a regional approach
for programmes in the region
(EU/Dutch, Belgian, Swedish
governments)
Trans-national
organisations/
governments
Mainstreaming of regional themes in country
programmes
$ Regional oﬃces (CRS/Action Aid),
regional coordinators (International Alert), regional meetings
between country oﬃces (Christian
Aid)
$ Streamlining country programmes
towards themes of importance in the whole region: land rights, rights of
youth to participate, violence against women (NPA)
International NGOs
Copying successful approaches and experiences
$ In Goma, NRC builds forth on
experiences with juridical assistance for people in land conﬂicts in its
Burundi programme.
$ In Burundi, Oxfam Quebec replicates its experiences with reconstruc-
tion work in Rwanda
International NGOs
IM AG I N I N G TH E GR E A T L AK E S R EG I O N 407
and to harmonise activities. CECI/Acipa also supported the regional
networks LDGL and COCAFemme, and helped facilitate the input of
civil society into UN-organised conferences for the Great Lakes Region,
by organising meetings in Goma and Kigali.7
Finally, for some international organisations, a regional strategy was
more of an internal organisational aﬀair. Examples are the integration of
region-speciﬁc themes in diverse country programmes, or the regional
exchange of best practices. Some considered programmatic regional co-
operation as a means to increase operational eﬃciency, for example, by
sharing emergency supplies between country oﬃces. However, this was
little tried and few successful examples could be identiﬁed.
The idea of approaching conﬂicts regionally, and in particular civil
society regional peacebuilding, is relatively new. Though many inter-
national and local organisations discuss regional peacebuilding, the actual
scale of its implementation remains unclear. Most current peacebuilding
interventions continue to focus on single countries. Further, despite the
fact that many civil society organisations from the region are interested in
regional strategies, most initiatives are still the result of eﬀorts by inter-
national organisations. Though various regional meetings among local
civil society organisations aimed at establishing programmatic cooper-
ation, regional civil society programmes remained limited. Most existing
regional programmes were actually initiated by international rather than
local organisations. Why was it so diﬃcult for civil society organisations
from the regions to realise regional peacebuilding? To provide some
answers to this question, let us explore some of the practices of regional
civil society peacebuilding.
R E G I O N A L A P P R O A C H E S T O P E A C E B U I L D I N G I N P R A C T I C E
To start the exploration of regional approaches in practice, let us reﬂect
on one particular example: the regional association of Catholic Bishops
T A B L E 1 (cont.)
Examples Initiators
Regional cooperation
$ The development programme of Cordaid Rwanda, together with the
provincial health authorities of Cyangugu, was able to facilitate medical
staﬀ for a Cordaid emergency programme after the volcanic eruption
in Goma
International NGOs
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ACEAC, and speciﬁcally one of the regional meetings it organised. This
regional initiative was supported by Caritas International and several
members of the international Caritas network, including the UK-based
development agency CAFOD and the Dutch development organisation
Cordaid.
In November 2004, ACEAC convened a two-day regional forum on
peace and reconciliation in Bujumbura, attended by about eighty priests
and members of the diocesan development bureaus and justice and peace
commissions from Burundi, Rwanda, eastern DR Congo and Tanzania.
Its aim was to identify whether agreement could be reached at a regional
level on how the Catholic Church could contribute to peace at com-
munity, national and regional levels. The ﬁrst day consisted of presenta-
tions by several bishops from the region, to provide their perspectives on
regional conﬂict. The archbishop of Bujumbura emphasised the evolving
economic rather than ethnic marginalisation of groups in Burundi, and
the involvement of the church in local reconciliation activities. The bishop
of Kilwa-Kasenga (DR Congo) underlined the role the Catholic Church
played in providing basic services to local communities, the protection
provided to refugees from Burundi and Rwanda, and the eﬀorts of the
church in preparing communities for the upcoming elections. The arch-
bishop of Kigali pointed out the diﬃculty of achieving reconciliation in
Rwanda, with the Hutu population’s continuing insecurity about land,
and large numbers of traumatised people. He underscored the important
role justice should play in the aftermath of the genocide, and considered
how the impending gacaca courts might contribute to this. On the basis of
these presentations, the participants discussed the regional importance of
trauma and local reconciliation, as well as local justice.
During the second day, the discussion focused on the question of how
the churches in the region could work together for peace in the region.
One of the working groups emphasised the importance of sharing ex-
periences, and debating analyses of local conﬂict. A participant pointed
out the need to look not so much at ethnicity in those conﬂicts but at how
ethnocentrism pervaded politics within all the countries in the region.
Another participant suggested that to develop a regional analysis of con-
ﬂict, an outside neutral research institute should be invited to come to an
interpretation acceptable to all. Among the participants, agreement could
be reached on some regional issues, in particular the presence of arms and
the need for demobilisation throughout the region. The group acknowl-
edged a need for ‘moral formation’ to assure the proper reintegration of
ex-combatants into the communities. A second working group focused on
how, through local-level activities, people could be mobilised to exchange
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experiences, for example of agricultural projects or youth activities.
Though representatives of international organisations present at the
meeting introduced ideas for various regional activities (a representative of
Caritas France proposed demonstrations in border regions, referring to
the burning of candles on a bridge in Sarajevo; another mentioned the
organisation of diaspora meetings involving diﬀerent nationalities), the
focus of most participants was on exchanges and collaborative lobbying
on commonly experienced human rights violations.
Striking in this example is that discussions on the regional dynamics of
conﬂict primarily concerned shared victimhood of human rights violations,
and trauma. The presentations of the bishops during the ﬁrst day did not
delve into the regional politics underlying violence, but pointed rather to
the eﬀects of violence on the population. Consequently, in considering
responses to violence, the focus was on protection, reconciliation and
healing. When discussing possible collaborative strategies, participants
suggested exchanging experiences on local reconciliation, and attuning
human rights advocacy. Though sharing experiences and concerns, or-
ganisations perceived little need for, or could not imagine, more substan-
tial forms of regional collaboration. Such an outcome was quite common
in regional peacebuilding workshops.
However, in the above example, beneath the diﬃculties in arriving
at more substantial regional collaboration, more was at stake. In the
plenary sessions, little reference was made to regional dynamics like those
analysed earlier in this paper, or to regional political developments. In
contrast, when meeting in private, participants from DR Congo would
precisely outline how and why the violence in the Kivu region was closely
related to Rwanda’s political and military involvement. Burundian parti-
cipants pointed to how political unrest spread from South Kivu into their
country. For many participants, it was very diﬃcult to talk about politics
openly. The impossibility of making regional political analyses resulted in
depoliticised regional strategies that focused on the local rather than the
regional dynamics of conﬂict, on eﬀects rather than causes.
The diﬃculties in regional analysis and programming
Many organisations found it diﬃcult to analyse the regional character
of conﬂict, and to establish how to take account of it in their programmes.
A number of factors hindered collaborative analysis and programmes.
A practical limitation to regional analysis and programming was that
many local and international organisations lacked regional experience and
expertise. Organisations which sought to give more attention to regional
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dynamics in their work encountered few scientiﬁc analyses on the
interconnectedness of conﬂict, peace and development in the region
(notable exceptions are Chre´tien 2003; Clark 2002; Lemarchand 2000;
Reijntjens 1994), let alone practical ones pointing out how to deal with
regional dynamics.
Next to these practical limitations, there were theoretical diﬃculties in
arriving at a regional understanding of conﬂict. In theory, a distinction
could be made between common problems (for example, the exclusionist
character of states, or the politicisation of ethnicity in various countries),
related or cross-border problems (for example, the presence of refugees or
militia from other countries, or the spill-over of identity conﬂicts from
one country to the other), and problems without borders (for example,
the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and the spread of arms).8 In
practice, it was diﬃcult to make such distinctions.
Land-related conﬂicts were identiﬁed as a (critical) regional dimension
in various regional platforms of local civil society organisations.9 However,
it was often diﬃcult to agree on the regional character of such conﬂicts,
which were interpreted both as a ‘common’ regional issue and as a ‘cross-
border ’ problem. In North Kivu, local land problems were seen as inex-
tricably linked to the issue of nationality. A case in point was Masisi, where
over recent years large tracks of land had been bought by a small group
of people, many of whom were Kinyarwanda speakers, and (senior)
members of the RCD and the Rwandese politico-military establishment.10
By some, the conﬂicts resulting from this development were considered
a cross-border issue, a direct result of the presence of the Rwandese.
However, several organisations in Goma argued that the problem
was basically about citizenship, and the failure of local land administra-
tion. In their view, land problems were more a ‘common’ issue: land
disputes in the region were similar in that they resulted from past failures
of local land administration and the erosion of local dispute resolving
mechanisms.
Hence, in regional meetings, organisations often could not agree on the
extent to which local manifestations of conﬂict were related to cross-
borders developments, rather than just showing similarities. It was even
more diﬃcult to agree on how diﬀerent issues and conditions interacted.
For example, to what extent could land disputes resulting from land
shortage be interpreted in the same way as conﬂicts resulting from the
abundance of natural resources? And in what ways should problems
of governance –such as exclusionism or criminalisation of the state – be
addressed simultaneously with other issues such as the cross-border spread
of small arms?
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As a result of these diﬃculties, it often depended more on the scope of
interventions envisaged by organisations whether they considered conﬂict
dynamics as ‘common’ or as cross-border issues, and if they focused on
one or several conﬂict dynamics. In cases where organisations had the
means to work regionally, their analysis tended to be more regional and
focused also on cross-border dynamics. In cases where they worked lo-
cally, their analysis focused on similarities between countries.
As a result of these conceptual diﬃculties, many organisations did not
really consider the regional character of particular issues. They simply saw
instability spilling over from one country to the other inevitably, or always
having repercussions in other countries. If instability was contagious, any
problem in any country required a regional strategy. Other organisations,
aware of the regional character of conﬂict, assumed a certain comparability
in the region, on the basis of which best practices could be replicated from
one country to the other. For example, considering their country in a later
stage of transition from conﬂict, Rwandese organisations promoted their
experiences for demobilisation and community reconciliation in Burundi.
Various international development organisations also copied intervention
strategies from one country to the other. As a result, regional and country-
speciﬁc analysis was de-emphasised, at the risk of glossing over both con-
nections and diﬀerences in the region.
In the absence of regional analyses, organisations found it particularly
diﬃcult to deﬁne regional programmes as a collaborative eﬀort of organ-
isations from diﬀerent countries. In theory, regional issues could be ad-
dressed in diﬀerent ways, including regional programmes coordinated
among organisations, similar programmes copied in diﬀerent countries,
or local programmes that take regional dimensions into account.
Interventions could target geographic areas (for example, the Kivu pro-
vinces), or inﬂuential groups that fulﬁl key positions in linking conﬂicts (for
example, civil society, regional media, trade networks), or focus on key
issues (for example, small arms) (Armstrong & Rubin 2002). In practice,
local organisations often failed to arrive at a focused analysis, identifying
diﬀerent levels of intervention and related strategies, and ended with
amorphous shopping lists of issues and related projects. One example was
a network of women’s organisations that in its regional analysis identiﬁed
nine pages of themes, and projects to address them. In the end, each
participant selected her preferred themes and projects, and no collective
prioritisation and programming was done.
Various organisations, rather than identifying developments they con-
sidered at the core of regional conﬂict in the Great Lakes Region, prior-
itised some general themes: ‘governance’, ‘ethnicity ’, ‘gender’, ‘ trade
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in arms’. Such a strategy reduced region-speciﬁc dynamics of conﬂict
to general trends that legitimised standard interventions. Others took
a ‘minimalist ’ regional approach, which only considered the (potential)
inﬂuence of regional issues on their own interventions (cf. Tschirgi
2002).11
As a result, there were few regional programmes with regional
activities. Exceptions were various programmes on refugees : the Catholic
Church organised exchange visits between refugees and people from
their home areas in order to entice refugees to go home, and the LDGL
platform conducted cross-border research on the background and situ-
ation of refugees. Another exception was a cross-border radio programme
organised by the US-based peace organisation Search for Common
Ground.
In the end, interpretation of regional conﬂict dynamics and appropriate
strategies depended mostly on the type and expertise of organisations and
their context of operation. Analyses of international organisations often
focused on issues of governance. Organisations from the region tended to
see governance in the context of regional dynamics of land, ethnicity and
citizenship. And while civil society organisations in Bukavu and Goma
highlighted the presence of Rwandese rebels and troops on Congolese soil
and their inﬂuence on the local population, organisations in Uvira em-
phasised local insecurity caused by the Mai-Mai. In contrast, civil society
organisations in Kinshasa were more concerned about elections and the
process of democratisation. Organisations from Bujumbura city high-
lighted the political dimensions of violence, while organisations in the
countryside also considered how violence in the rural areas had gained an
ethnic dimension. Staﬀ members of human rights organisations high-
lighted impunity, and the deplorable record on human rights of various
politicians, in their regional analyses. Farmers’ organisations emphasised
the problems of land and the return of refugees. Regional approaches and
strategies did not logically present themselves from the context in which
organisations operated. Consequently, organisations tended to focus on
those themes ﬁtting their expertise and organisational priorities.
Regional analysis and programming thus came out as processes of de-
ﬁning the region. How the region was constructed around particular issues
depended much on how, and by whom, problems were analysed.
Regional discourse is an ordering practice, creating coherence out of
fragmented ideas, experiences and practices – or, in other words, a way of
understanding or framing the world, by which we make sense of com-
plexity (Law 1994). Diﬀerent regional approaches developed in the prac-
tice of civil society organisations, depending on the expertise, operational
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context and, above all, the identiﬁcation of the region by the organisations
concerned. Since it was diﬃcult for civil society organisations to arrive at a
shared understanding, common regional programming was complicated.
Each organisation created an image of the region that suited its pro-
grammes.
The politics of regional imagination
Civil society organisations make ideological choices, and wittingly or un-
wittingly play political roles. Rather than being just value-driven and
apolitically taking care of the interests of local communities aﬀected by
conﬂict, their members personally experience the impacts of conﬂict, and
also position themselves within conﬂict discourses. The emergence of civil
society regional approaches therefore cannot be separated from the de-
veloping regional political context. Imagining regional approaches for the
Great Lakes Region was deeply embedded in politics. Coming to a shared
analysis among civil society organisations from the region was not only a
theoretical endeavour, but also a political one.
A ﬁrst obstacle for regional initiatives is sensitivity to instability and the
day-to-day conﬂict experiences of the participating civil society organis-
ations. Progress made in months could be undone in a matter of days. The
anarchy after the rebellion by a group of RCD soldiers in Bukavu in June
2004 set back rapprochement programmes between the Banyamulenge
(who were perceived as close to the Rwandese) and the other communi-
ties, thereby complicating the return of Banyamulenge refugees from
Burundi. Continuing instability in DR Congo and Burundi brought many
to question whether it was the appropriate time for regional approaches.
This made some conclude that internal political change was needed before
international rapprochement was possible.
Secondly, tensions between governments from the region were re-
plicated in civil society relations, due to the closeness of civil society or-
ganisations to their governments and political movements. While in the
past civil society in eastern DR Congo was often considered activist and
outspoken, violence and insecurity had severely restricted organisations’
freedom of action. Civil society had become ethnicised and no stranger to
partisan tendencies (Romkema 2001). The Catholic Church was not
exempt from these divisions. The bishop in Goma and many priests there
were considered pro-Rwandese, while in Bukavu the Catholic Church was
seen as a major symbol of resistance against the RCD. In some instances,
the distinction between civil society and formal politics was blurred, with
civil society organisations functioning as a springboard to state politics.
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In Rwanda, although there was an active associational life, NGOs had
always been state-controlled, and had diﬃculties developing an
oppositional attitude towards the government (see also Unsworth & Uvin
2002). Rwandese civil society organisations had to participate in umbrella
groupings, which were said to be ﬁrmly government controlled. NGOs
working in Rwanda had to perform a balancing act in the themes they
could work on, and in their criticism of government policies.12 Congolese
and Burundese organisations doubted the independence of the Rwandese
organisations they encountered in meetings. There were for example in-
dications that, for preparatory meetings to the UN regional conference,
Rwandese civil society representatives had been appointed by the
presidential oﬃce. In Burundi, in recent years, civil society had started
to openly express itself politically, partly in opposition to and partly in
conjunction with the government (Ntsimbiyabandi & Ntakarutimana
2004). Many insiders and outsiders doubted the independence of
Burundese civil society, as associational life seemed dominated by Tutsi
organisations, and rumours abounded about organisations being sup-
ported by politicians.
As a result of this, civil society organisations often associated themselves
with national discourses of conﬂict in their home countries. Many rep-
resentatives of international and local organisations interviewed over the
course of this research considered the involvement of civil society in con-
ﬂict politics as the major challenge to regional civil society peacebuilding.
As a result of the aﬃliation of civil society to national political discourses,
regional encounters were a platform for political confrontation, as well as
for exchange.
At the time of ﬁeldwork, the relationship between the Burundese and
Rwandese governments was fair, with the electoral victory of the ethni-
cally mixed CNDD-FDD in Burundi in late 2005 even resulting in further
rapprochement. Rwandese–Congolese relationships continued to be
tense. Serious political divisions continued within the Kivu provinces, in
particular between political leaders connected to the RCD power-
holders, and those supporting the Kinshasa government. These tensions
were directly reﬂected in relations between civil society groups from the
region.
A crucial point of disagreement between civil society groups from
Rwanda and North Kivu was their diﬀerent understanding of the presence
of the Interahamwe. The Rwandese authorities had blamed the Congolese
for not taking action against the presence of those militia – main per-
petrators in the Rwanda genocide – on Congolese territory, and this had
been the legitimisation for entering DR Congo. However, several
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Congolese civil society organisations considered the Rwanda government
part of the problem because it would not provide space for dialogue on
the possible return of the Interahamwe. Its presence in DR Congo was also
seen to cover up interests in resource exploitation. Furthermore, many
Congolese organisations in Bukavu were disappointed by the lack of
understanding from their Rwandese colleagues for the suﬀering
the Interahamwe were inﬂicting on their people. This issue broke up many
regional initiatives.
At a regional women’s conference in Kigali in mid-2004, as a prep-
aration for the UN Great Lakes regional conference, the participants were
unable to reach agreement on what peace in the Great Lakes Region
should look like. Before the meeting, the representatives from DR Congo
were urged ‘not to go and talk to our attackers ’. At the meeting,
Rwandese and Congolese organisations had diﬃculty in distancing
themselves from the discourses of their governments. The Rwandese
women focused on the genocide in their country, and the ensuing right of
Rwanda to ﬁght the militia responsible that were still residing on
Congolese soil. To the Congolese women, it appeared that the Rwandese
women condoned the violence from their government in DR Congo, and
failed to see that ‘peace for the Rwandese is a continuation of human
rights violations by the Interahamwe in our areas ’.13
In other cases, the political positions taken by civil society organisations
turned regional encounters into events where power was renegotiated,
positions could be strengthened and legitimised, and the deﬁnition of the
region could be contested. At various regional exchanges, the status of
participants was ﬁercely debated, especially between organisations from
eastern DR Congo and Rwanda. Often, the Congolese regarded civil
society from Rwanda as representing the vision of their authorities rather
than of their Rwandese constituents. At the same time, various Congolese
organisations interpreted singling out the eastern Kivu provinces in donor
programmes as supporting claims for a diﬀerent status in the Congolese
state, and threatening national sovereignty.
In 2002, the CECI-Acipa programme deliberately included Kinshasa-
based organisations, to counter the impression among Congolese groups
that it favoured Kivu civil society, which was perceived as collaborating
with Rwanda. In a workshop in 2004, a full day was lost on discussing the
new location of the secretariat. The Rwanda and Burundi delegations
proposed Goma, and strongly opposed Kinshasa, afraid of problems
with Congolese migration oﬃces when travelling there. Goma, however,
was unacceptable to most Congolese, who considered it under Rwandese
inﬂuence, and argued that their capital was Kinshasa. The Congolese
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proposed Bukavu as a middle course, which was refused by Rwanda and
Burundi. Finally the oﬃce remained in Rwanda.14
Rather than civil society organisations serving as forces for peace, and a
counterbalance to their national governments or sub-national contenders
for political power, civil society organisations were deeply involved in
regional politics. The political complications of regional civil society
initiatives, and the fact that several regional civil society meetings had
been accused of partisan tendencies, made some donors hesitant about
getting involved in regional approaches.
The political engagement of civil society in regional politics strongly
aﬀected the analysis of regional issues. The aﬃliation of regional civil
society organisations to their home governments fuelled suspicions on the
sincerity and intentions of the other players in regional encounters. This
reduced the willingness to talk openly about issues of regional concern.
To deal with returning refugees and rationalise land use, in 1996 the
Rwanda government started a programme for villagisation and resettle-
ment (Imidugudu) (see van Leeuwen 2001). During preparatory meetings for
a regional workshop on land issues in Bujumbura, organised by the
Catholic organisation CED-Caritas, representatives of Rwandese organ-
isations were quite critical of the programme and underlined the practical
problems in its implementation. In the meeting itself, those same people
gave presentations of the programme that were fully in line with the pos-
ition of the Rwandese government. This also happened at other regional
meetings. Subsequently, several organisations in Burundi came to con-
sider the Imidugudu programme a good example for dealing with land
problems in their own country.
A frustrating experience for international organisations was that often
the preparation of regional meetings was a transparent process, in which
civil society organisations from diﬀerent countries or regions voiced their
independent opinions, while during the regional encounters they moved
towards the positions of their governments. Suspicion of the intentions of
others and identiﬁcation with the positions of their respective governments
obstructed a genuine exchange of experiences.
Various international development organisations, in convening regional
meetings between their partners, deliberately chose not to discuss regional
politics, considering this too sensitive. Regional political issues were also
circumvented because of their sensitivity at the November 2004 regional
forum of ACEAC discussed above. In the formal parts of the encounter,
participants made little reference to government politics at national level,
and discussed conﬂict in their home regions without the slightest reference
to the regional conﬂict history.
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A few days before the forum, the ﬁrst of a series of UN regional con-
ferences had taken place in Dar-es-Salaam. During the breaks between
sessions, participants discussed the outcomes of this conference, and
commented on the renewed threat of the Rwandese president after
the conference to intervene militarily in DR Congo, disregarding
commitments made a few days earlier. No comments were made on this in
the formal parts of the forum. During the breaks, I had also various dis-
cussions with participants from DR Congo on the role of Rwandese
military in the insecurity aﬀecting their areas. People also commented on
the likely cooperation between militia from DR Congo and the Burundese
FNL, and the latter’s involvement in the Gatumba massacre in August
2004 (see HRW 2004). Representatives from diﬀerent countries partici-
pated in, or listened attentively to, such discussions. In the oﬃcial parts of
the forum, regional politics was not talked about.
Such political sensitivities had consequences for the regional strategies
envisaged. In the case of the ACEAC forum, the unwillingness or
inability of participants to address regional conﬂict issues resulted in
a concern for the eﬀects of conﬂict (and how to deal with them), rather
than the causes. To circumvent conﬂict between the participants, regional
strategies focused on technical rather than political cooperation, such as
exchange of experiences, and replicating best practices.15
In many regional encounters considering solutions for regional
problems, the outcomes likewise reﬂected a preference for national
strategies rather than regional ones. For example, various expatriates
considered that land scarcity in Burundi and Rwanda implied a need
for a regional solution, including regional economic specialisation
and more ﬂexibility in migration policies. Organisations from the region
considered the scarcity of land in their own countries as a given, and
to them the problem was the failure of governments to develop agriculture
or promote alternative ways of making a living. To them, the consider-
ations of the expatriates would become relevant only after their heads
of state had reached regional agreements. Suggestions on regional solu-
tions to national land problems were also way ahead of what could
be imagined by organisations from North Kivu, considering the prob-
lematic presence of Kinyarwanda speakers in the region and the perception
of a historical process of Rwandese infringement on Congolese borders.
Highlighting the national character of problems and solutions rather
than their regional political aspects was probably also a political strategy in
itself. Though the Rwanda government has emphasised the harmful
presence of Hutu militia, and the ethnicisation of community relations in
eastern DR Congo, regional dynamics seldom play a role in the discourse
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of the Rwandese government explaining the build-up to the 1994
genocide.16 Nor was this issue much discussed between Burundese and
Rwandese civil society organisations. One could speculate that emphasis-
ing such regional dimensions might have drawn the character of the
Rwandese and Burundese state into the analysis. This was an issue which
organisations were willing to discuss in private, but not in meetings with
representatives from the other countries, as they did not want to be seen
criticising their respective governments.
The ‘politics of regional imagination’ thus played an important role in
how regional civil society peacebuilding in the end came about. In many
cases, the diﬃculties in reaching a shared analysis were the result not
so much of a lack of analytical power, but of deep political cleavages. One
might even speculate that the diﬃculties discussed earlier in arriving at
collaborative regional analyses were not so much a technical or conceptual
problem, but resulted from organisations circumventing thorny political
issues, and de-emphasising the regional linkages between problems.
Emphasising shared victimhood was then a ﬁrst step in coming closer to
each other.
The regional imaginations of international organisations
As a ﬁnal point, in reviewing the diﬃculties in realising regional civil so-
ciety peacebuilding, the ambitions of donors and international develop-
ment organisations supporting such eﬀorts require review. International
organisations often assumed that regional exchanges and cooperation
would be to the advantage of their partners, who would learn from each
other, and whose collaborative eﬀorts would be more eﬀective than their
separate programmes. It was however questionable how far organisations
from the region shared this assumption. Rwandese organisations inter-
viewed in the course of ﬁeldwork often suggested that organisations from
other countries could proﬁt from their experiences, but did not assume
they could learn anything from others. This attitude did not contribute to
their motivation to participate in regional meetings. Various rep-
resentatives of local and international organisations observed that, with-
out motivation from donors to exchange experiences, local partners were
not inclined to meet. For many local civil society organisations, it was
already problematic to work in synergy at a national level, let alone the
regional level. They considered this the major shortcoming of civil society
regional initiatives, which in their eyes were ‘ talk shops ’ in which organ-
isations participated to entice their donors, but which did not translate
into action.
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Further, apart from those specialised in lobbying and advocacy, civil
society organisations often found it diﬃcult to imagine regional strategies
with direct relevance for their ongoing work. Most (peace) activities of
local organisations were on a local scale. Though experiencing the impact
of regional developments on their local interventions, they had the feeling
that they could continue business as usual, with or without a regional ap-
proach.
As noted earlier, various regional platforms of local civil society
organisations discussed land-related disputes. Many of the participants –
having expertise in agricultural programmes for enhancing community
conﬂict resolution – were primarily concerned about the impact of
land conﬂicts. They acknowledged that similarities existed with other
parts of the region, and were interested in exchanging experiences on
local reconciliation practices. The cross-border causes of land conﬂicts
were less of an issue to them, as these were beyond the reach of their
interventions.
Many local organisations felt no urgent need for regional exchange
and cooperation. In their daily practice, regional approaches and strate-
gies did not logically present themselves. While for some organis-
ations regional cooperation had advantages (being a member of a
network provided protection), for other organisations such advantages
were far less. It was thus questionable whether the imagined advantages
of regional exchange and cooperation were as important for civil society
organisations from the region as they were for their international sup-
porters.
Moreover, in the perception of local civil society organisations, the in-
ternational insistence on regional approaches contrasted starkly with the
fact that only a few donors were willing to fund regional activities – often
because regional activities did not ﬁt their funding practices, which were
organised on a country basis. This further decreased the motivation of
local organisations for regional analysis and programming.
Finally, international organisations and donors considered regional
strategies with civil society as alternative or complementary to diplomacy.
In their view, they provided an opportunity to circumvent the sovereignty
of states. Through working with civil society at a regional level, inter-
national organisations would contribute opinions, criticism and ideas,
without confronting particular governments. As such, regional civil society
encounters were complementary to regional initiatives at diplomatic level.
The question was whether the political aspirations of supporting organ-
isations matched the ambitions, mandates and expertise of their partners
in this respect. These aspirations built on an image of civil society as a
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counterweight to governments, a role to which many of their partners did
not aspire.
: : :
International organisations all have the same agenda. Everybody works on peace
and security and a regional approach, everybody works with the same partners.
What is the added value of a regional approach? The regional approach is a
hype. (Diplomat, interview, Kigali, 10.1.2005)
The above quotation shows the belief of several interviewees that regional
discourses were no more than a fashion in the development scene. To
them, regional discourses reﬂected an institutional need to regularly come
up with new notions to legitimise the existence of the sector. Alternatively,
they considered talking of regional approaches a discursive practice to
hide the failure of national and international organisations to eﬀectively
address conﬂict in the Great Lakes Region. Nonetheless, many rep-
resentatives of national and international organisations considered
regional approaches imperative because they contributed to a better
understanding of what conﬂict was about, and indicated the need to op-
erate regionally. For a variety of reasons, however, the shift to regional
approaches remains more theoretical than practical.
Many local and international organisations found it diﬃcult to
analyse the connectedness of regional issues in a way that would result
in regional programming, and to arrive at a shared regional under-
standing. Regional discourses were diﬀerent ways of making sense of
complex conﬂict dynamics. Improved understanding of complexity,
however, did not provide for strategies to deal eﬀectively with this com-
plexity.
Moreover, regional discourses on peacebuilding were shaped in a pol-
itical process and related to the political space for civil society organis-
ations, and their relationship with their governments. Civil society
organisations appeared to be fundamentally political in nature, and deeply
involved in the everyday politics of peace and conﬂict. This political
nature of organisations meant that regional platforms for peace were not
necessarily peaceful. Rather than working towards an ‘ imagined regional
community’ (cf. Anderson 1983/1991) of civil society organisations – as
hoped for by many outsiders – state borders and the regional political map
continued to play an important role in how civil society identiﬁed itself. As
a result, it was diﬃcult to facilitate exchange of experiences and establish
regional cooperation, and to realise shared understanding of regional
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issues and regional solutions. Rather than providing neutral spaces for
generating ideas and launching opinions and criticism, regional fora and
exchanges were often interfaces where diﬀerent regional discourses met,
representing diﬀerent readings of conﬂict. At many regional exchanges,
such diﬀerences were silenced to circumvent conﬂict between the partici-
pants. The outcomes were depoliticised regional strategies that focused on
the similarly experienced consequences of regional conﬂict, rather than on
the underlying political diﬀerences.
The challenge of civil society regional peacebuilding is thus not just
about acknowledging the regional character of conﬂict, but more about
reconciling the diﬀerences between the civil society organisations in-
volved, and coming to a shared regional imagination. Some considered
that, in order for this rapprochement to happen, agreement between
governments was ﬁrst required. However, a less pessimistic picture
evolves when considering existing networks that had overcome regional
diﬀerences to some extent. The question is whether civil society organ-
isations will be able to challenge the regional policies of their governments
or other regional players, as long as they have not overcome the diﬀer-
ences between themselves. This may be too much to expect of civil society
organisations. As Mamdani (2001) suggests, regional reform may also
come about through the example set by other countries in the region.
Perhaps the most important role civil society organisations can play in
achieving regional peacebuilding is bringing about political reform within
their own countries. In this, regional dialogues may inspire processes of
reform in other countries.
What could be the role of international organisations in this? Civil
society regional approaches for peace require the fostering of regional
identiﬁcation between civil society organisations, rather than assuming it.
International organisations might support and facilitate this. Regional
identiﬁcation will never come about without encountering the other
players from the region; thus I agree with Galtung (1996/2003: 271) on the
need to ‘ let one thousand conferences blossom’. To achieve a shared
regional identiﬁcation, maybe the sharing of similar experiences is indeed
more important than exchanging dissimilar views on what conﬂict is
about. Exchanges and platforms may therefore be more important than
regional civil society programmes. More prominence could also be given
to enhancing already existing regional contacts, such as those between
universities and trade networks. Even if the resulting exchanges are de-
politicised, we should consider them as a ﬁrst necessary step in a process of
regional identiﬁcation and (ﬁnally) reconciliation. At the same time, we
should not disregard the relevance of meeting backstage in regional
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encounters, where politics may be discussed informally, and acknowl-
edgement of regional connectedness may be achieved.
Finally, international organisations should not have too high ambitions
in supporting regional civil society peacebuilding. They should be careful
not to expect levels of cooperation that often do not even exist at a national
level, or to assume that their local partners share their expectations of the
beneﬁts of regional programmes and exchange. Donors’ imagination of a
regional civil society doing what their governments failed to do – bringing
regional peace – was far beyond the realities of their partners. Before
drafting programmes and setting expectations, donors should realise that
there is no such thing as a Great Lakes Region in a singular sense, and ask
instead how local people imagine (the possibilities of ) their region.
N O T E S
1. Representative of a US-based conﬂict resolution NGO, interview, Bukavu, 27.1.2005.
2. Representative of a Norwegian development organisation, interview, Kigali 12.1.2005.
3. This programme, ‘Beyond Conﬂict ’, is a collaborative research programme of the Dutch de-
velopment organisation Cordaid and Wageningen Disaster Studies. The programme aims to investi-
gate views and practices of peacebuilding of Cordaid and its partners. I wish to thank WOTRO
(Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research) for providing funding for my
research.
4. Although experience shows that in existing regional bodies attention for conﬂict prevention (let
alone conﬂict resolution) developed only after economic cooperation and political integration had been
achieved (Lund 1999: 58), the idea remains strong.
5. Some accounts include the 1993 assassination of Burundi’s ﬁrst elected Hutu President Ndadaye
as an element in the chain of crisis.
6. Organisations arguing for regional approaches include various UN organisations, donors such as
SIDA, the Dutch government and the OECD; international organisations such as International Alert,
CECI, NPA, Christian Aid, Life and Peace Institute, Search for Common Ground, Pax Christi
International, and numerous local organisations.
7. Interviews in Kigali, January 2005; Bujumbura, February 2005; Goma, August 2005.
8. See for example Uvin et al. (2004), who distinguish actions at regional level and multi-national
activities to address trans-border dynamics ; and activities in several countries to address national
problems that share common characteristics, or have an indirect regional impact.
9. Donor interest in regional land issues was limited, and the theme has not been high on the
agenda of those regional exchanges facilitated by them.
10. Interviews, Goma, August 2005.
11. Such diﬃculties were not just experienced by international NGOs and organisations from the
region. The proposal for a regional approach of the Dutch government (Uvin et al. 2004), for example,
started from the general development priorities of the Dutch government. After a consultation with the
Dutch embassies in the region, this regional approach was reduced to giving attention to regional
issues in individual country-programmes.
12. Nonetheless, some organisations were able – very carefully – to criticise the government, for
example regarding proposals for new land legislation.
13. Interviews in Bukavu, January 2005; Bujumbura, July 2005; Goma, August 2005.
14. Interview, Bujumbura, February 2005.
15. This reﬂected the regional eﬀorts of their governments. The ﬁrst UN regional conference for the
Great Lakes Region in November 2004 resulted in a series of proposals for regional cooperation. All of
those proposals were foremost of a technical nature – to promote regional economic integration, to
respond to the needs of conﬂict-aﬀected populations – focusing on similar issues in all countries, rather
than on regional political diﬀerences.
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16. Neither the oﬃcial documentary produced at the commemoration of the genocide in 2004, nor
the genocide memorial in Kigali, makes any reference to this (personal communication, Thea
Hilhorst).
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